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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit was surprisingly idle in this area of height-
ened regional activity. Little litigation in natural resources
reached the federal appellate level; those cases that were decided
all involved oil and gas (and the derivative product of helium),
and not mining. Public lands and environmental law-the other
two areas addressed in this section-yielded even fewer decisions
in the Tenth Circuit, although it is to be expected that 1977's
congeries of new federal legislation' will shortly begin generating
important cases in both fields.
Noteworthy Tenth Circuit lands and natural resources deci-
sions are described below. Two in particular may have far-
reaching consequences. In Backus v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co., 2 state ability to regulate natural gas pipelines was
shown to be significantly hedged by constitutional restraints. In
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,3 the court, by finding an implied
reservation of federal easements of access, created a potentially
troublesome federal incursion on some private lands that adjoin
the public domain.
I. NATURAL RESOURCES
The Tenth Circuit decided four cases of interest in the natu-
ral resources area. In Marathon Oil Co. v. Kleppe,I Judge McWil-
liams held that water injection wells located off the participating
area may be counted in determining the royalty owed to the
United States. The royalty is calculated by dividing the average
daily production of all wells by the total number of wells, and
subjecting the result to the percentage rates specified by the
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West 1977); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 7 ENmV. L. REP. 42,401
(1977) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West 1977); Clean Air Act, as amended, 7 Ew.m. L. REP.
42,201 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642); Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (West 1977).
558 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1977).
No. 76-1138 (10th Cir., May 17, 1977).
556 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977).
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lease.5 Thus it is to the lessee's advantage to have the nonproduc-
ing, water-injection wells included in the total number of wells.,
The court decided to include the well not located in the partici-
pating area based on the following: The plain meaning of the
governing regulation and unit agreement, a refusal to resort to
technical grammatical interpretation, and the policy of encourag-
ing the most efficient production techniques, including off-area
injection wells.7
In the second case, McCombs v. Federal Power Commission,
the Tenth Circuit decided that a formal application is not essen-
tial to an abandonment under section 7(b) of the Natural Gas
Act.' The parties' recognition of the gas well's depletion and the
Commission's participation in that recognition through two let-
ters requesting a formal application were deemed by the court to
be sufficient for abandonment.' 0 The holding of abandonment in
McCombs meant that, although the abandoned tract had pre-
viously been certified for interstate service, new wells, on the
same tract, discovered several years after abandonment were not
subject to the certification and so could be used freely for intra-
state service without violation of the Natural Gas Act."
In another oil and gas decision, Judge Breitenstein in Backus
v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.' 2 held unconstitutional an
Oklahoma statute" which required pipeline companies to furnish
gas on request to landowners whose land the pipeline crossed. The
statute violated the commerce clause" because it operated to
"withdraw a large volume of gas from an established interstate
current,"" and so interfered with interstate commerce." The
5 Id. at 983. The provision setting the royalties in this case is found at 30 C.F.R. §
221.49 (1977), quoted in 556 F.2d at 984. As a similar provision was incorporated in one
of the unit agreements before the court, the agreement provision was controlling in that
instance. 556 F.2d at 983.
556 F.2d at 983.
Id. at 984-86.
542 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1976).
15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
IS 542 F.2d at 1148-49.
Id. at 1149. The certification provisions of the Natural Gas Act appear at 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f (1976).
I2 558 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1977).
* OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 10 (1971).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
IS 558 F.2d at 1375 (quoting FPC v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 406 U.S. 621,
633 (1922)).
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court considered the possible cumulative effect of service to the
landowners to be substantial enough to bring the statute within
the commerce clause, even though the service to any one
landowner would probably be insignificant."
The Oklahoma statute was also violative of the supremacy
clause,'" since it "frustrated the full effectiveness"'" of the Natu-
ral Gas Act. 0 The Act gives the Federal Power Commission au-
thority to regulate, among other things, natural gas pipeline com-
panies." The Oklahoma provision trespassed the Commission's
authority by creating an exception to its jurisdiction," and so was
unconstitutional under the supremacy clause. The court noted
additionally that the Commission had previously acted in the
area of service to those whose lands were crossed by pipelines.2
The area was thus pre-empted by the federal agency, and the
state could exercise no authority.
The other major case in the natural resources area this year,
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.," dealt with the pur-
chase price of helium under the Helium Act.21 The majority opin-
ion, written by Judge Seth, held that the price paid to the owners
of the helium, extracted from natural gas and sold to the United
States, is determined by the "work-back method. 26 The Tenth
Circuit rejected the market price-comparable sales method be-
cause there is no free market in helium gas and other sales of
helium were not comparable.Y Expert testimony as to the value
of the helium was rejected as mere opinion.2
In applying the work-back method, the court noted that ele-
ments of proper starting value from which to "work-back," return
6 558 F.2d at 1375.
Id.
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
" Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 654 (1971), cited at 558 F.2d at 1376.
15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970).
21 Id. § 717.
" 558 F.2d at 1376.
2 Id. at 1375 (citing Northern Natural Gas Co., F.P.C. Op. No. 773 (Aug. 13, 1976)).
24 554 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1977). The court also considered the procedural issues of
limitations, prejudgment interest, attorneys fees, and choice of law. Id. at 389-92. Judge
Doyle dissented, objecting to the use of the work-back method. Id. at 393-98.
- 50 U.S.C. §§ 167-167n (1970).
" 554 F.2d at 387-88.




on investment, costs allocable to gas production, and various
other factors should be considered.29 The result of the work-back
method is not tied to any contract price for helium negotiated
between the natural gas producer and the government, 30 and in
the Ashland case the method appeared to result in a higher value
than that agreed upon between the gas producer (Phillips) and
the government.3'
II. PUBLIC LANDS
In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States32 the United States ap-
pealed a summary judgment in favor of the Leo Sheep Company
for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Quiet Title Act.
a3
Appellees, who owned certain odd-numbered section of land as
successors-in-title to the Union Pacific Railroad, claimed that the
United States unlawfully entered their property by blading a road
across their section corners in order to give the public access to
interlocking sections of public domain.
Reversing the Wyoming District Court, the Tenth Circuit
found that in the original grant of land to the railroad in 1862,
"Congress by implication intended to reserve an easement to per-
mit access to the even-numbered sections which were surrounded
by the lands granted to the railroad. '34 If the contrary were true,
the court continued, the remaining public domain lands would
have been inaccessible and under the railroad's exclusive control,
a state of affairs Congress could not have intended.
3 5
In support of their finding of an implied easement, the court
cited the Unlawful Inclosures Act of 1885,'3 which outlawed ob-
struction of passage over or through the public lands, and three
early cases. The cases forbid fencing of private lands in such a
manner as to encircle government lands,37 and allowed a passage
2 Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 389.
I' d.
' No. 76-1138 (10th Cir., May 17, 1977).
28 U.S.C. § 2409a (Supp. II. 1972).
No. 76-1138 slip. op. at 8.
0 Id. at 8.
- 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1970).
" Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
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for sheep trailing over the privately-owned interlocking sections
to reach pasturage on publicly owned lands.-
The dissent argued that the majority misstated the issue-
"whether the United States may take the private land for access
purposes without compensation"-and argued that the govern-
ment had not claimed such an easement for 110 years."'
Plains Electric Generation & Transmission Coop. v. Pueblo
of Laguna removed a lingering threat to the sovereignty of Pueblo
lands in New Mexico. Plains brought a condemnation action for
an electrical transmission line and substation right-of-way
through lands held by the Laguna Pueblo. Jurisdiction was based
on the Act of May 10, 1926,1' which allowed condemnation of
Pueblo lands in accord with New Mexico law for any public pur-
pose. The Pueblo and the United States' motion for dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction was denied by the New Mexico District
Court.42 The Tenth Circuit reversed and dismissed the case, find-
ing that the 1926 Act had been repealed by implication and that
the district court was without jurisdiction.
The court voted that, although repeals by implication are not
favored, the legislative history and congressional intent of the Act
of April 21, 1928,'4 demonstrated that the Act was intended to be
a substitute for the 1926 Act, thereby replacing it. The earlier act
had been passed to allow the state to get a right-of-way for a
railroad through the plaza of the Pueblo. The railroad was built
before a New Mexico district judge found the 1926 Act to be
insufficient to authorize condemnation because there was no
mechanism to join the United States as a party." Congress passed
the 1928 Act to give its ratification to the already existing railroad
and to allow future rights-of-way through the Pueblo "under such
rules, regulations and conditions as the Secretary of the Interior
may prescribe." 5 The Tenth Circuit found that Congress' method
n Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890); Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co., 219 F.2d 116 (8th
Cir. 1914).
" No. 76-1138 slip. op. at 1-2 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
542 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Act of May 10, 1926, 44 Stat. 498.
42 542 F.2d at 1376.
,3 Act of April 21, 1928, 45 Stat. 422, 25 U.S.C. § 322 (1970).
542 F.2d at 1377.
25 U.S.C. § 322 (1970).
1978
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
did not amend the earlier act, but supplanted it, since if the 1926
Act were still in effect, the section of the 1928 Act requiring the
Secretary of Interior's permission would be without effect."
The New Mexico judge dissented, saying that the Pueblo and
the United States had not adequately met the burden of proof
necessary to demonstrate repeal by implication.
The remaining case of interest in the public lands area is
Boyd v. United States.18 Plaintiffs alleged an agreement made
with a Corps of Engineers attorney to exchange Boyd's piece of
property, which would be required for a Corps flood control pro-
ject, for property not required by the project which had been
purchased by the Corps was binding on the government. How-
ever, sole authority to exchange government land for private
property in relation to river improvement rests with the Secretary
of the Army." Since the Secretary did not approve, the agreement
was without effect. The Tenth Circuit relied on longstanding
principles to find that "unauthorized acts of government agents
cannot result in the government's loss of its property."50
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The Clean Air Act5 and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act 52 produced no Tenth Circuit decisions, and the 1977 amend-
ments to the former have, or course, yet to make their effects felt.
Likewise, federal acts for the preservation of wilderness or wild-
lifess gave rise to no Tenth Circuit cases in 1977, and the "second
generation" of federal act" remain too recent for Tenth Circuit
interpretations. The only two environmental law decisions of 1977
both arose under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
542 F.2d at 1379.
" Id. at 1381 (Seth, J., dissenting).
No. 76-1398 (10th Cir., July 18, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
33 U.S.C. § 558b (1970).
No. 76-1398 at 9.
4' 7 ENvuR. L. REP. 42201 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642).
4 33 U.S.C. 1251-1376 (Supp. 1975).
13 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1970); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1970); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(Supp. 1975).
" Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West 1977); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 7 ENVm. L. REP. 42401 (1977) (to be codified
in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j9 (Supp. 1975);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (1977).
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(NEPA)15 and they, in the main, only refine established, though
controversial, Tenth Circuit constructions of that legislation.
In League of Women Voters v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,5" the Tenth Circuit prolonged a split in the circuits by
applying the irreparable harm test for a preliminary injunction
pending a decision on whether an environmental impact state-
ment is required. The League had requested an injunction of
contract negotiations between the Corps of Engineers and the
City of Tulsa concerning water storage rights in the Oolagah Re-
servoir.5" The League sought the injunction separately from its
principal suit challenging the Corps' failure to file an EIS with
regard to the contract.
Judge McWilliams, in allowing the principal suit to proceed
without halting the contract negotiations in the meantime, relied
on the conventional preliminary injunction test of irreparable
harm.5 8 The district court had found that, as the contract was
only at the negotiation stage, no immediate and irreparable harm
could be shown.5" The Tenth Circuit affirmed that finding, as no
abuse of discretion was indicated, 0 and affirmed the denial of the
injunction.
In adverting to the irreparable harm test, Judge McWilliams
cited four cases,' none of which dealt with NEPA. That the sub-
ject matter of the requested injunction was merely an unsigned
contract, and nothing more irrevocable, did provide a reasonable
context for invoking this test. 2 Even so, other circuits have
adopted a special test for preliminary injunctions under NEPA:
A preliminary injunction pending a decision on the need for or
adequacy of an EIS requires only a showing that a major federal
action is involved. 3 In other words, a prima facie showing that
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1970) (hereinafter cited as NEPA).
" No. 77-1401 (10th Cir., Aug. 19, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
Id. at 2.
" Id. at 4. The court did not find it necessary to reach the other traditional prelimi-
nary injunction issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id.
" Id. at 3.
0 Id. at 4.
" Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc. 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975); Tape Head Co. v.
RCA Corp., 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,
426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970); Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969).
' But see National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1971), where
the Tenth Circuit held that contract termination was sufficient to require an EIS.
" See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975). See
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NEPA has been violated warrants a preliminary injunction.0 ' The
court could have analyzed the unsigned contract as not being a
major federal action significantly affecting the environment, 5 but
instead chose to remain indifferent to injunction exigencies under
NEPA16 by applying the standard of irreparable harm.
In Manygoats v. Kleppel7 an injunction was sought against
the performance of an agreement, approved by the Department
of Interior, between the Navaho Tribe and Exxon Corporation for
the mining of uranium on 400,000 acres of tribal land. Seventeen
members of the tribe challenged the adequacy of the EIS filed by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs relating to the mining lease. 8 Judge
Breitenstein affirmed the denial of the injunction on the ground
that the EIS was adequate.
After holding that, under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Navaho Tribe need not have been joined, 9
the court reviewed the adequacy of the EIS under the three-part
test of National Helium Corp. v. Morton:0
(1) Whether [the statement] discusses all of the five procedural
requirements of NEPA.
(2) Whether the environmental impact statement constitutes an
objective good faith complaince with the demands of NEPA.
(3) Whether the statement contains a reasonable discussion of the
subject matter involved in the five required areas."
The court stated that the EIS was adequate as to each part and
also Note, Injunctions, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and the Fourth
Circuit's Chimera of Revocability, 60 IoWA L. Rlv. 362 (1974), and F. ANDERSON, NEPA
IN THE Coutrs 240 (1973). It appears that only the Tenth and Fourth Circuits have backed
away from the per se rule for preliminary injunctions under NEPA.
"1 Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Hwy. Auth., 563 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir.
1972).
See Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974); Note,
Environmental Law-The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Standard of Review
of Agency Action in the Tenth Circuit, 52 DEN. L.J. 299, 305-07 (1975). League of Women
Voters may be read as enforcing the Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to view agency inaction
as a negative EIS determination, although that issue was not reached.
" In an earlier case, Vivant v. Trans-Delta Oil & Gas Co., Nos. 74-1115, 74-1116 (10th
Cir., Nov. 27, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit also applied the
irreparable harm test under NEPA.
'7 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977).
' The court confirmed that mining leases of Indian lands do engage NEPA require-
ments. Id. at 557.
' Id. at 559.
?0 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
11 558 F.2d at 560.
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rejected each of the plaintiffs' six objections to it."
The case may be criticized for utilizing the National Helium
test to effect excessively low standards for EIS adequacy. Inquiry
into three of the objections was avoided through the court's char-
acterization of them as "conflicting scientific findings. '7 3 EIS
consideration of the cumulative effect of the project with other
resource development projects was not required because to do so
would involve "prophecy beyond the capabilities of both scien-
tists and courts. . . .It is enough that the EIS mentions and
discusses foreseeable problems." 4 The court appeared to be se-
cure in its less than extensive scrutiny of this EIS because of the
project's "continuing federal control."75 That federal supervision
will prevent environmental depredations by Exxon is, perhaps,
arguable. And, at any rate, the intent of NEPA is that the EIS
be a method of guaranteeing that federal action is deliberate,
prudent, and informed of risks to the environment. Thus, that a
private action will be federally supervised ought not to excuse a
superficial EIS.
Manygoats is significant in two regards: (1) Because the case
was not dismissed for nonjoinder of the tribe, it is apparent that
the Tenth Circuit will treat Indian lands under NEPA in the
same way as any other lands, and not through special supervision
by the tribe; (2) the National Helium standard of review of an




' Id. at 560-61.
13 Id. at 560. These objections concerned inadequate discussion of dewatering, tailings
seepage, and permanent contamination of aquifers. Id.
" Id. at 560-61.
71 Id. at 561.
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